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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
MINERAL RIGHTS
Patrick H. Martin*
The tempo of litigation concerning mineral rights appears to
have increased in the past year. Undoubtedly the state bar can ex-
pect this trend to continue for several reasons. Drilling activity for
oil and gas has increased in recent years. This is attributable to in-
creased demand and to greatly increased prices allowed under fed-
eral regulations for both crude oil and natural gas. And with the
price increases, it has become profitable to rework older fields or
undertake enhanced recovery techniques that a short time ago
would have been economically or technically unfeasible.
As a result, the rights to produce minerals and enjoy their
revenues have become more valuable, giving property claimants an
ever greater incentive to establish their rights. Claims will increase
as some lessors come to feel their leases are unfair, many of them
executed at a time when a one-eighth royalty and low bonus and
delay rental prevailed, while their neighbors with more recent
leases enjoy much higher income. Additionally, landowners whose
properties are burdened by servitudes reserved or granted under
far different economic circumstances are likely to assert the invalid-
ity of those rights.
The next several years will be very important ones in the
development of Louisiana mineral law. The Mineral Code, effective
January 1, 1975, is still quite new, and relatively few cases have
arisen under it. In the background, and heavily affecting traditional
property rights issues, is a complex mass of federal regulations pre-
senting problems for all parties to which a state court should be sen-
sitive. There will be many significant cases, and the courts will have
the opportunity to render decisions that can provide for certainty
and stability in an area of the law that is acutely important for this
state. If they fail, the effects will be felt for a generation, not only
by mineral rights owners and claimants but also by the other citi-
zens of the state and, indeed, the country.
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION- LEVEE DISTRICT
In Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. LeBlanc' the Louisiana Supreme
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 362 So. 2d 734 (La. 1978).
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Court decided an issue that had been touched upon in several cases
in recent years, ie., whether a levee district can be divested of
mineral rights through acquisitive prescription. Article IV, section 2 of
the 1921 constitution provided that "[i]n all cases the mineral rights on
any and all property sold by the State shall be reserved ..... Is a levee
district an agency of the state for purposes of this provision of the
1921 constitution? The supreme court held that it was a state agency
for this purpose; in so holding, the court followed a First Circuit
Court of Appeal decision of 1976, Shell Oil Co. v. Board of Commis-
sioners,' and dictum in a supreme court opinion of last term, Board
of Commissioners v. S.D. Hunter Foundation.'
CONVEYANCE PROBLEMS
A number of problems dealing with the creation and transfer of
mineral rights have recently reached the courts. The decided cases
are not remarkable for the issues of law which they resolve; but
they do serve to indicate, in several cases particularly, the need for
careful draftsmanship in the conveyance of mineral rights and a
clearer indication of the intentions of the parties to such convey-
ances.
Lease: Necessity of a Writing
Must 'a mineral lease be in writing to be effective? The third cir-
cuit in Bills v. Fruge held that it must and that it is subject to the
parol evidence rule. This case arose when the plaintiff sent a lease
to a co-owner of land, who was in prison at the time, together with a
bank draft as bonus for granting the lease. The defendant endorsed
the draft to another, and it Was paid, but he neglected to sign the
lease or return it to the plaintiff. The defendant, however, executed
a mineral lease on the land to another, but only after the plaintiff
had filed in the conveyance records of St. Landry Parish a copy of
the draft and the unsigned lease, together with an affidavit setting
forth the facts surrounding his effort to get a lease. The court held
that the plaintiff did not acquire a lease by the defendant's endors-
ing the draft for payment because there was no written lease signed
by the defendant; and the signed draft did not constitute a written
lease because it did not show the essential element of consent to
lease.
2. 336 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 338 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1976).
3. 354 So. 2d 156 (La. 1977).
4. 360 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
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Warranty Deed
In Dillon v. Morgan5 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal was
asked to consider the effect of a warranty deed given under the
following circumstances. An owner of land, Dean, sold land to the
defendant, Morgan, reserving to himself a servitude as to one-half
the minerals. Morgan thereafter sold the same land by warranty
deed to the plaintiff, Dillon, reserving to himself one-half the min-
erals. When the plaintiff learned of Dean's existing servitude, he
brought suit claiming a breach of warranty by Morgan. Dillon claim-
ed that he was acquiring the land subject only to a mineral ser-
vitude as to one-half the minerals; Morgan, on the contrary, claimed
that he was reserving the one-half not already reserved by Dean.
Reversing a trial court opinion that Dean owned a servitude as
to one-half and Dillon and Morgan each owned one-fourth, the second
circuit held that the deed warranted ownership of one-half to Dillon,
and the effect of Morgan's reservation was simply to reserve from
the sale that which had already been reserved to Morgan's vendor,
Dean. Explaining its result in terms of an estoppel,' the court
stated:
By whatever name, the principle is sound that a seller should
not be allowed to obligate himself to deliver and to warrant title
and peaceable possession to a buyer of a thing and then by his
own act or claim to derogate from, or to assert rights to the
thing contrary to, his obligations.'
The court further rejected Morgan's contention that, if the servi-
tude in favor of Dean should expire, the reservation of one-half the
minerals in his own favor should then become effective; the after-
acquired title doctrine, the court said, could not operate to a party's
own benefit.' As to both principles the court has ruled properly and
in accordance with the weight of authority.'
Top Lease
Where there is no warranty of title, express or implied, in the
conveyance of an interest, there is no recovery of damages for
failure to convey the interest. Frequently a lessor of mineral rights
will be asked to execute a top lease, a lease to become effective in
5. 362 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
6. The court cited and relied upon Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 240 La.
198, 121 So. 2d 831 (1960), and Gaines v. Crichton, 187 La. 345, 174 So. 666 (1937).
7. 362 So. 2d at 1132.
8. Id. at 1133.
9. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 311 (1977).
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the event that an existing (or base) lease is, or will become, invalid.
Generally, the lessee of the top lease knows he is paying a bonus for
the mere possibility that the base lease will expire; and, should it
not expire, there is no basis for him to sue his lessor.
In Scoggin v. Bagley"0 the plaintiff had taken a top lease on cer-
tain land from the defendant through brokers. The base lease had a
primary term of five years from December 8, 1972. It could only be
extended beyond December 7, 1977, by production, by drilling opera-
tions occurring at the time, or by inclusion of the lands, or a portion
of them, in a unit from which there was production. The plaintiff
took the top lease on December 5, 1977, knowing that there was no
production from the leased land and no shut-in wells and that no
drilling rig would be available to begin drilling by December 7. The
top lease specifically provided: "All monies paid are nonrefundable."
What the plaintiff did not know was that an October 1977 unitiza-
tion order placed the acreage in question into a unit where produc-
tion was in existence, thereby extending the lease beyond the
primary term so long as there was production from the unit.
The plaintiff brought suit to invalidate the top lease and gain a
return of his money. He claimed that his purchase was premised on
the assumption on his part, or on the representation by the brokers,
that only drilling would extend the base lease. The court held that
the brokers were not agents of the lessor and statements by them
were not attributable to the defendant, that the language of the top
lease was unambiguous and contained no limitation based on drill-
ing, and that defendant had no reason to believe that the plaintiff
wrongly assumed that only drilling would extend the lease."
Partition
In Patrick v. Johnstone2 the second circuit was presented with
a question involving partition of land burdened by a mineral servi-
tude. Patrick and J. Johnstone owned a tract in indivision which was
burdened by a mineral servitude owned by W. Johnstone created
out of J. Johnstone's undivided one-half interest. In earlier litigation
the trial court had ordered a partition by licitation, but the second
circuit had ordered the trial court to reconsider its decision and in-
structed it to look to not only the appropriate articles of the Civil
Code but also of the Mineral Code which had just become effective. 3
The trial court again ordered partition by licitation, and this time
the second circuit affirmed.
10. 368 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
11. I at 767.
12. 361 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
13. Patrick v. Johnstone, 312 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
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Adopting the opinion of the district court, the second circuit
held that, with respect to partition of immovable property, there is
a presumption in favor of partition in kind.1' This presumption may
be rebutted by showing that the land is burdened by a mineral right
created by fewer than all of the co-owners of the land to be parti-
tioned. After this showing there arises a presumption that the prop-
erty is to be partitioned by licitation, a presumption that can be
rebutted only by proof that the requirements of article 178 of the
Mineral Code have been met."8 This article provides that in such cir-
cumstances there can be a partition in kind only if
it can be accomplished in such fashion that the allocation of
tracts to the co-owners assures that both surface and mineral
values of each tract are in the same proportion to the total value
of the surface and the mineral rights respectively as each co-
owner's interest bears to the whole of the surface and the min-
eral rights respectively."6
Such proof will, in most cases, be very difficult to make, and thus
the presumption in favor of partition by licitation will be difficult to
overcome. Most cases will be decided in favor of partition by licita-
tion, as was the present controversy. This may work hardships on
some parties, but the provisions of the Mineral Code for appraisal
and sale 7 are as fair and equitable a procedure as can be under-
taken. Despite the fact that the second circuit's opinion is somewhat
at variance with its prior disposition of the case, the court has
adopted the proper approach to partition under the Mineral Code.
Multiple Servitudes on a Single Tract of Land
The typical grant or reservation of a mineral servitude in Loui-
siana is accomplished in a manner more like the common law than
the civil law. The typical reservation, for example, will provide that
"A conveys to B Blackacre, reserving to A, his heirs and assigns, all
of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under Blackacre." Under
the Mineral Code, the effect of such language is to create a right to
produce the minerals, one which runs throughout Blackacre. It must
be used within ten years or it will prescribe for nonuse, but any use
of the servitude will interrupt liberative prescription as to the
whole of the servitude. Yet, it is often overlooked that the parties to
the creation of a servitude do have flexibility to alter the normal
14. 361 So. 2d at 896. See Babineaux v. Babineaux, 237 La. 806, 112 So. 2d 620
(1959).
15. LA. R.S. 31:178 (Supp. 1974).
16. Id-
17. LA. R.S. 31:180-85 (Supp. 1974).
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consequences of a servitude. Thus, the Mineral Code specifically
allows the creation of a mineral servitude which will cease to exist if
not used within a shorter period than ten years or which requires
more to interrupt prescription than merely drilling to a depth at
which one would reasonably expect to find oil or gas.18 And, as the
next case illustrates, parties may create separate servitudes at dif-
ferent depths on a single tract of land, each of which must be used
in order to interrupt prescription as to that servitude.
In Roemer v. Caplis"9 the plaintiff, Roemer, was the owner of
land upon which a producing well was drilled to a depth below 3100
feet in 1972. The defendants claimed that they owned a mineral ser-
vitude upon the land which had been created in 1949 and continued
in existence by production from the land, the wells for which were
above 3100 feet. It was the plaintiff's claim that the production
referred to by the defendants only interrupted prescription for a
servitude on the land above 3100 feet, that there had been a sepa-
rate servitude created in 1949 as to the minerals below 3100 feet,
and that the latter had prescribed for nonuse in 1959, as there had
been no drilling or production below 3100 feet until 1972.
Analyzing several instruments of sale, the court concluded that
they clearly created two separate servitudes, one for the minerals
lying above 3100 feet and one for the minerals lying below 3100 feet.
It was improper for the court to consider unrecorded documents
that suggested a contrary intent since the plaintiff was not privy to
them. In rejecting the defendants' contention that Louisiana law
does not allow the creation of separate horizons or levels ("horizon-
tal" servitudes), the court noted that article 72 of the Mineral Code
provides that the parties to an act creating.a mineral servitude may
alter the applicable legal rules, subject to limitations specified in
articles 73-79. Although article 68 provides that a single mineral ser-
vitude is established on a continuous tract of land notwithstanding
that certain horizons are excluded, it is not prohibited by articles
73-79 to provide otherwise, and it is implicit in article 68 that one
may do so. This holding is consistent with prior jurisprudence," and
there was no intent to change the existing law in the Mineral Code.
Once recognizing that separate horizontal servitudes may exist
with respect to the same tract of land, it logically follows that use of
the servitude above 3100 feet would not constitute use of the servi-
18. LA. R.S. 31:74-75 (Supp. 1974).
19. 369 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
20. See White v. Frank B. Treat & Sons, Inc., 230 La. 1017, 89 So. 2d 883 (1956);
Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320, 182 So. 519 (1938); Iberville Land Co. v. Texas Co., 4
La. App. 221, 128 So. 304 (1st Cir. 1930).
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tude below 3100 feet. There must be development of each servitude
to prevent prescription from running against it.
The court appears entirely correct in its holdings as to the
points of law. Parties should have flexibility in creating rights in
property, and there is no good reason to doubt that the Mineral
Code allows for separate horizontal servitudes on a tract of land.
Yet, it is no criticism of the court to acknowledge that other prob-
lems may arise in the future as a result of the approach. For exam-
ple, where there are servitudes created above and below 5000 feet,
suppose that drilling takes place by the owner of the servitude
below 5000 feet through the servitude above it. May the owner of
the upper servitude adopt the operations of the owner of the lower
servitude when there was no intent to attempt to complete a well in
the upper servitude? What legal effects might flow if there were
multiple owners of the servitudes and one or more persons had an
interest in both servitudes? The mere possibility of such problems
is, of course, no reason to suggest that the court has created more
difficulties than it has solved.
LEASE MAINTENANCE AND IMPLIED COVENANTS
The standard oil and gas lease in Louisiana, as in other states,
provides expressly for its continuation beyond the primary term so
long as either oil or gas is produced from the leased land. Two ques-
tions frequently arise in the "secondary" term of the lease with
regard to this express provision. What constitutes production, or
cessation of production, for purposes of continuation of the lease?
Under what circumstances will compliance with the express provi-
sion of the lease be inadequate to maintain the lease as to its entirety?
Cases on both issues have been decided in the past term.
The requirement of a mineral lease that there be production to
continue the lease is universally interpreted to mean "production in
paying quantities."'" In Smith v. West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. 2 the
second circuit held that a lease had terminated for failure of the
lessee to maintain production in paying quantities in the secondary
term. In so doing, the court may well have used an inappropriate
standard to reach its decision.
The tract in question in Smith was about 680 acres which had
been part of a much larger area leased in 1919. Although a number
of wells had been drilled on the tract, only one remained in produc-
21. In Louisiana this is specifically required by statute. LA. R.S. 31:124 (Supp.
1974).
22." 365 So. 2d 269 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), revd, 373 So. 2d 488 (La. 1979).
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tion by 1977. The lessee, West Virginia Oil & Gas, had undertaken
in 1974 to secure more development by entering into a farmout
agreement. By September and October of 1977, the farmoutee and
his assignees had drilled four more wells capable of producing gas
on the tract, but they were shut in for lack of a market. The plain-
tiffs demanded cancellation of the lease in December, 1977, alleging
it had terminated for failure to produce in paying quantities. The
trial court refused to grant a preliminary injunction restraining the
company from constructing a gas pipeline on the property and from
alienating gas from the property, but the second circuit held that
the lease had terminated and that the defendants should be en-
joined.2
The court, in finding that the lease had failed to produce in pay-
ing quantities, considered the revenue, the costs, and a shut down of
the well during 1977. The revenue for 1977 was $593 on a volume of
6599 Mcf being sold under contract at nine cents per Mcf. Expenses
for the well totalled $1,592.07. The well was completely shut in in
November, 1977, because of a gas leak, but was repaired and produc-
tion resumed in March, 1978. It is not indicated in the opinion if the
expenses included amounts spent to repair the leak.
Did the second circuit properly apply articles 124 and 125 of the
Mineral Code? Article 124 specifies that in order to maintain a lease
by production, the production must be in paying quantities." The
article states, however, that production is in paying quantities
"when production allocable to the total original right of the lessee to
share in production under the lease is sufficient to induce a reason-
ably prudent operator to continue production in an effort to secure a
return on his investment or to minimize any loss."25 The purpose of
this is to separate the lessee who is operating prudently from the
one who is sitting on the lease for speculative purposes, doing little
or nothing to earn a return but denying its use to anyone else. A
temporary shut down of a well for maintenance or repair does not
mean that production has ceased, nor does a period in which costs
exceed revenues necessarily indicate that production in paying quan-
tities has ceased.
From the reported facts, it appears the lessee was not retaining
the lease for mere speculation. It was working to repair the well and
23. Id. The supreme court reversed because a preliminary injunction was inap-
propriate as the plaintiffs had failed to establish that irreparable injury would result,
and the validity of the mineral lease was not at issue in the trial of the rule for a
preliminary injunction. The case was remanded to the district court.
24. LA. R.S. 31:124 (Supp. 1974).
25. Id.
1980]
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to keep gas flowing. Four more wells, capable of producing gas, had
been completed. The lessee was not standing idle, and the cessation
of production here would appear to fall within the well-recognized
principle of a "temporary cessation," under which a lease does not
terminate.' Further, the court seems to resurrect the pre-Code ap-
proach to "production in paying quantities." The court noted that
the lessor's royalty amounted to only twenty-one cents per day dur-
ing 1977 and commented that, in a 1941 case, "royalty averaging less
than fifty cents per day was considered not to be in paying quanti-
ties.12 7 The comments to article 124 clearly indicate that the pre-
Code approach is no longer applicable.28 Article 125, which the
second circuit neglected to cite or discuss, specifically states that "in
applying Article 124, the amount of the royalties being paid may be
considered only insofar as it may show the reasonableness of the
lessee's expectation in continuing production."' It would appear,
then, that the court perhaps would have reached a different result
in this case had it more closely observed the pertinent provisions of
the Mineral Code.
Two cases, both in the second circuit, have arisen in the past
term on the subject of the obligation to develop the leased property
as a prudent operator. Even though a lease may be held beyond its
primary term by its express requirement of production or produc-
tion in paying quantities, the lessee must undertake such other drill-
ing and development as would a prudent operator. In other jurisdic-
tions, the obligations of the lessee are referred to as implied cove-
nants of the lease; in Louisiana, these obligations are found in article
122 of the Mineral Code.'
To determine what a prudent operator acting in the best inter-
ests of both his lessor and himself would do, the courts of most
jurisdictions have asked whether the lessor who has demanded addi-
tional development has proved the substantial likelihood of produc-
tion in paying quantities from the proposed development." Since
such proof is generally possible only in proven formations, most
courts have recognized only an implied covenant of reasonable
26. See, e.g., Stimson v. Tarrant, 132 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 751 (1943); Saulsberry v. Siegel, 252 S.W.2d 834 (Ark. 1952); Clifton v. Koontz, 325
S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959).
27. 365 So. 2d at 274, citing Parten v. Webb, 197 La. 197, 1 So. 2d 76 (1941).
28. LA. R.S. 31:124 comments (Supp. 1974).
29. LA. R.S. 31:125 (Supp. 1974).
30. LA. R.S. 31:122 (Supp. 1974).
31. See generally Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore,
Develop and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27th OIL & GAS INST. 177 (Matthew
Bender 1976).
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development and not one of "further exploration," which would, if
accepted, require a lessee to undertake exploratory or speculative
operations. Louisiana courts, however, have not sharply distin-
guished between these two but have simply required lessees to act
as prudent operators. In concept, this is entirely appropriate; but, in
practice, it has left each court to shape on its own the contours of
conduct of a prudent operator. As a result, lessees have lost leases
or portions of leases in Louisiana that probably would have contin-
ued had the property been located in other jurisdictions.
One of the two implied covenant cases considered here, Vetter
v. Morrow,2 concerned a 385 acre lease in Red River Parish which
was held beyond the primary term by production from several unit
gas wells off the tract. More than 100 acres were included in units
established between 1972 and 1976; after having demanded addi-
tional drilling by the defendant in May, 1977, however, the lessors
brought suit in August, 1977, seeking cancellation of the lease as to
250 acres not included in the units. At trial the plaintiffs gave evi-
dence that the westward trend of the Hosston formation indicated
drilling would be profitable on the leased tract. The defendant gave
evidence that a well was proposed to the north of the 250 acres and
that a prudent operator would await the outcome of that well before
drilling on the acreage in question. The second circuit affirmed the
trial court's judgment for plaintiffs in cancelling the lease."
The second case, Waseco Chemical & Supply Co. v. Bayou State
Oil Corp.,' appears to be the first reported case in the country in
which a lease has been cancelled for failure of the lessee to under-
take a form of enhanced oil recovery known as "fireflooding."35
Although its holding has not been unanticipated,36 it does break new
ground in requiring a lessee to utilize technical methods of recovery
still in the developmental stage and is likely to cause concern among
producers in other jurisdictions.
The lease in Waseco covered 80 acres in the Bellevue field in
Bossier Parish, a field of about 900 surface acres. The oil in the field
32. 361 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
33. Id. at 901.
34. 371 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
35. For a discussion of fireflooding and other methods of enhanced recovery, see
NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY (1976); INTERSTATE OIL COM-
PACT COMMISSION, SECONDARY AND TERTIARY OIL RECOVERY PROCESSES (1974);
ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: SECONDARY AND TERTIARY METHODS (M. Schumacher ed.
1978).
36. Martin, Enhanced Recovery: Institutional and Other Aspects (presented at
24th Mineral Law Institute (1977)), reprinted in TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
MINERAL LAW (1980).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
is a heavy, asphaltic, high viscosity oil. When defendant Bayou State
took over the lease in 1952 and 1953-it had been executed in 1934-
there were about 50 wells on the 80 acres, and most of these were
producing. By 1976 only nine wells were producing, at an average of
about six barrels a day. In twenty-four years the defendant made no
capital expenditure on the lease and drilled no wells.
On a neighboring lease, Getty Oil Co. undertook fireflood opera-
tions as early as 1963 and expanded these operations in subsequent
years to other nearby or adjacent tracts. Cities Service Co. also had
fireflood operations in the Bellevue field.
In fireflooding, the operator ignites a part of the oil in place and
water and air are injected in the formation. The viscosity of the oil
is reduced and a portion is vaporized. The oil is then driven forward
to a production well by a combination of steam, hot water and gas
drive. Only a very tiny percentage of all oil produced in this country
is produced using fireflooding, and many of the projects using this
method are regarded as experimental.
Suit for cancellation of the lease was filed by the lessors in 1977,
although the court observed that demands and inquiries were made
by the lessors for several years before that. The trial court held for
the lessors and the second circuit affirmed. 7
In its opinion the second circuit looked to article 122 and relied
on Vetter for precedent as to the duty on the lessee. It noted the ex-
tensive fireflood operations of both Getty and Cities Service in the
same field and that "royalty owners under fireflood recovery receive
more than $1200 per acre per month while those under a stripper
recovery receive less than $3 per month."38 Further, it discussed the
fireflood operations of the defendant on another nearby lease that
over time proved profitable.
As to both law discussed and facts recited by the second circuit,
the Waseco opinion has a certain persuasiveness to it. Yet, upon
closer scrutiny, this writer is left with the conclusion that the deci-
sion is deficient in several important respects.
As to the legal standard, article 122 is certainly the pertinent
Mineral Code article. It requires that the lessee develop and operate
the property as a reasonably prudent operator for the benefit of
himself and his lessor. To establish a breach of the duty, the lessor
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that development
not performed would have benefited both the lessor and the lessee.
37. 371 So. 2d at 313. The Louisiana Supreme Court has denied writs. 374 So. 2d
656 (La. 1979).
38. 371 So. 2d at 312.
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The fact that royalty owners on other fireflood operations receive
many times as much money as those on the land in question is ir-
relevant to the issue of overall profitability of an operation because
the lessor's royalty is completely cost-free; the royalty owner profits
from any additional production even if the operator takes a tremen-
dous loss. There is little in the Waseco opinion to show that the
lessor proved that fireflooding would have been profitable on the
acreage in question at the time when the lessee was alleged to have
breached its development duty. The court completely ignored the
tremendous jump in the value of oil after 1973 if it qualified for a
high price category under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
of 1973."' There is nothing in the opinion regarding Getty's profit-
ability in its operations, and its methods of recovery are largely con-
fidential, ie., its knowledge on this highly sophisticated method of
recovery is not generally available to other prudent operators. This
is underscored by Cities Service's involvement in the field when it is
noted from a recent report in the Oil and Gas Journal0 that the
Department of Energy is underwriting a sizeable portion of the com-
pany's cost of development because of the experimental nature of
certain operations. Federal subsidization of development would
hardly seem appropriate if it were clear that fireflooding in the field
would be profitable to a prudent operator. The fact that federally
funded development is taking place in the same field should not be
used to establish that the lessee had not acted as a prudent oper-
ator; indeed, it should suggest that a prudent operator might await
the outcome of experimental operations before adopting similar
techniques.
Finally, it should be stated that in both Vetter and Waseco, the
court's remedy, immediate cancellation of the lease, was inappro-
priate. In neither case was drainage of oil or gas from the lessor's
property shown. What, then, was the loss to the lessor, accepting
the court's determination that the lessee breached a duty to
develop? The lessor may have had to wait a period of several years
to enjoy income he might have had earlier had development taken
place. Since he had not lost the oil, it will yet be produced; at most
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-60h (1973); 10 C.F.R. § 212.54 (1979) (stripper well). The price
of a barrel of crude oil has gone from about $5 on the average in 1973 to about $32 for
"stripper well" crude and other special categories in 1979.
40. OIL AND GAS J., June 4, 1979, at 66. A Department of Energy report on the
project is available. DEP'T OF ENERGY, BODCAU IN SITU COMBUSTION PROJECT (SAN/
1189-2, February 1979). A 1976 report in the Oil and Gas Journal indicated that the
number of active in situ combustion projects in the United States had dropped from 38
in 1970 to 21 in 1975. OIL AND GAS J., April 5, 1976, at 107. Getty's Bellevue project
was described as the nation's "pacesetter."
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he lost the interest that could have been earned had he invested the
royalty. 1 This loss could easily be satisfied by payment of damages
without lease cancellation, where the lessee is given the opportunity
to develop the lease. Outright cancellation is thus seen in its true
light: it is punitive in character. This was especially true in Waseco.
In Vetter the lessee kept at least the developed portions of the
lease which had been included in units. In Waseco the lessee lost the
production that it had been maintaining for some years.
The second circuit's application of Civil Code articles 2046 and
2047 in Waseco is unsatisfactory. These establish the existence of an
implied resolutory condition in all commutative contracts. They pose
little difficulty where the duties of the parties to the contract are
express and clear and the obligation remains executory. The duties
of a lessee under article 122 of the Mineral Code are not of this
character in many or most circumstances, and it is generally im-
possible to place "matters in the same state as though the obligation
had not existed," as- Civil Code article 2045 specifies is the purpose
of the resolutory condition. The usual remedy in other jurisdictions
for breach of the duty to develop is, at most, conditional cancellation
of the undeveloped portion of the lease, allowing the lessee to under-
take the proposed development if he so chooses. 2 Not only is this
not allowed in Vetter and Waseco, but in Waseco the lessee does
not even get to keep the production it was maintaining at the time
of the suit. The immediate cancellation granted is a harsh remedy,
more punitive in nature than an attempt to give the damaged party
the benefit of the "promised" performance. Continued decisions of
this sort only encourage litigation by lessors who, after all, bear no
cost of development, stand to lose nothing but the cost of the litiga-
tion, and stand to reap huge benefits by having returned to them
land in which the lessee has, in many instances, spent much money
in exploration and development.
41. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 9, at § 834.
42. Id. Article 2047 does contain the provision that "the party in default may, ac-
cording to circumstances, have a further time allowed for the performance of the con-
dition." Professor Litvinoff has observed, as the court acknowledged in Waseco, that in
applying this provision "the court takes into consideration the extent and gravity of
the failure to perform alleged by the complaining party, the nature of the obligor's
fault, the good or bad faith of the parties involved, and also the surrounding economic
circumstances that may make the dissolution opportune or not." 2 S. LITVINOFF, OBLI-
GATIONS § 270, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 509 (1975). In light of the great
risks to the lessee and the lack of disincentives to demands for additional development
by a lessor and the impossibility of returning the parties to the time before drilling
and development under a lease, it seems to this writer that the court has improperly
weighed the factors.
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GAS PURCHASE CONTRACT LITIGATION
Another area of the law that has produced significant litigation
in the past term is gas purchase contract problems. Such contracts
are complex and are today significantly affected by federal regula-
tion under the Natural Gas Act of 1938" and now the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978." A division between "interstate gas" and "intra-
state gas" has profoundly influenced production and marketing in
the past, and on "interstate gas," gas purchase contract terms have
been dictated by the Federal Power Commission (recently succeeded
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
Payment of Royalty; Purchase of Gas; Favored Nation Clause
The Louisiana Supreme Court issued a significant decision in
one gas purchase contract case, Hall v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.45
The controversy arose from a contract pertaining to the Sligo field
in Bossier Parish for the purchase of gas by the defendant Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas (Arkla) for a term of twenty-eight years, beginning in
1952. The agreement contained a "two party favored nation" clause
in which Arkla promised that, should it purchase gas from any other
seller in the field at a higher price, it would escalate the purchase
price to the sellers (plaintiffs here) under the 1952 agreement to the
same price. In 1961 Arkla acquired, through an assignment, a fifteen
percent working interest in an oil and gas lease granted by the
United States on land in the Sligo field. As a lessee under this lease,
Arkla was bound to pay a royalty to the United States; the United
States could elect to be paid its royalty in. kind or on the basis of
the fair market value attributed to its percentage of production. The
government chose the latter method; and, unlike other lessors, the
government had the power under the lease to specify the value of
the gas for purposes of royalty computation. The value specified by
the government for Arkla's royalty was higher than the purchase
price paid by Arkla to the plaintiffs under the 1952 gas purchase
contract. The plaintiffs brought suit claiming the royalty payment
was a purchase within the meaning of the favored nation clause,
thus triggering an escalation of the price. Although remanding the
case for recomputation of damages, the supreme court affirmed the
second circuit's affirmation of a trial court judgment for plaintiffs.
There are several troublesome aspects to the Hall case, but the
most significant is the court's determination that a payment of
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1976).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-432 (1979).
45. 368 So. 2d 984 (La. 1979).
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royalty, in which the lessor has the option of taking the gas in kind
and the power to specify the value upon which the royalty is paid, is
a purchase of gas by the lessee. If the option of taking or not taking
the gas was the lessee's, the taking of gas and the paying of a royalty
would seem more clearly a purchase. And if the "price" paid for that
gas were set by some factor other than the determination by the
lessor of the gas's value, that would lend itself to the conclusion that
there had been a "purchase." But such was not the case.
Consider the dilemma of the purchaser of gas who is also a pro-
ducer in similar circumstances under the court's approach. Its only
choices are to pay the royalty specified by the United States, and
thus trigger the escalation clause, or to give up the lease when the
government demands a royalty for gas valued at a higher level than
the sale price of other gas in the field, and thus lose not only the
royalty gas of the lessor but also all the working interest gas.
Neither of these seems a very sound choice, and it brings out the
point that the election of the lessor not to take gas in kind is not a
purchase of the gas by his lessee. This is not to suggest that a regu-
latory agency could not for some purposes treat it as a sale of gas
(or oil under a similar provision in a lease) or that the parties them-
selves could not define it to be a purchase. The issue is whether
these parties meant to treat it as a purchase for purposes of the gas
purchase contract escalation clause, and it is doubtful that most peo-
ple in the industry would regard it as a purchase. Accordingly, it
strikes this writer as a questionable proposition. Nevertheless, the
supreme court allowed recovery for damages all the way back to the
time when defendant first paid the higher royalty to the United
States, even though the Federal Power Commission, which had
jurisdiction over the purchase price, would have had to allow the
operation of the escalation clause for there to have been damage."
The court felt it was the defendant's fault that prevented a deter-
mination on that issue by the F.P.C. at the time of the "purchase."' 7
Price Increase Under Contract: Well Commencement
In Olinkraft, Inc. v. Gerard" the plaintiff Olin was a purchaser of
46. The Federal Power Commission would allow price escalation clauses in very
narrow circumstances after April 3, 1961, Order 242, 18 C.F.R. § 154.93, 27 Fed. Reg.
1356 (1962), and limited their operation in contracts in effect on June 7, 1954, Order
174-B, 18 C.F.R. § 154.94, 19 Fed. Reg. 8809 (1954).
47. The court relied on Civil Code article 2040 which provides: "The condition is
considered as fulfilled, when the fulfillment of it has been prevented by the party
bound to perform it." The only way in which the defendant "prevented" fulfillment of
the "condition" (filing of a new rate schedule in hopes of getting F.P.C. approval of a
higher rate) was failing to inform plaintiffs of the "purchase" by the defendant.
48. 364 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
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gas from defendant Gerard. Olin wanted additional wells drilled on
property covered by a natural gas purchase contract. To get these
drilled rapidly, it promised defendant an additional 13-1/2 cents per
Mcf if the drilling of the two wells were "commenced (spudded) on
or before December 31, 1974." One well was spudded on November
22, 1974, but the contractor for the defendant indicated he could not
begin his work until a month after the December 31, 1974 deadline.
After attempting unsuccessfully to get an extension from Olin, the
defendant agreed with the contractor for a January 31, 1975 com-
mencement date for the second well, but then had a water well rig
drill a twenty-two-foot hole at the second well site and inserted a
conductor pipe on December 31. Olin refused to pay the higher price
on the grounds that the well was not commenced by December 31
because there had been no actual spudding of the well. The hole
drilled by the water well rig was not, contended Olin, to be con-
sidered actual spudding. Both the trial court and the second circuit
agreed.49 With respect to leases, well commencement is generally in-
terpreted to include actual steps at the site that are preparatory to
drilling; actual spudding is not required." But where the parties to a
contract specify spudding to be the commencement, that should be
the standard applied. The drilling of the hole by a water well rig
was not the spudding of the gas well and was not even useful to the
gas well. Hence, the court was correct in concluding that the re-
quirements of the contract had not been satisfied.
Venue for Litigation Concerning Gas Purchase Contract
What is the proper venue for litigation over the terms of a gas
purchase contract? That was the issue presented in Hawthorne Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Continental Oil.51 The third circuit held that where
the agreement granted not only the right to purchase gas but also
the right of ingress and egress to lay pipelines and construct facili-
ties, the agreement had multiple objects, and since the right to go
on the land was a right in, to, or against immovable property, the
proper venue was the parish where the immovable rights were
located, not the principal place of business of the foreign corpora-
tion.52
By identifying the multiple objects of the agreement, the court
avoided some difficulties that might arise from other language in its
49. Id. at 645-46.
50. See Allen v. Continental Oil Co., 255 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971);
Breaux v. Apache Oil Corp., 240 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
51. 368 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd No. 64,429 (La. Nov. 1, 1979).
52. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 80.
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opinion. The court indicated that the nature of the gas purchase con-
tract, when not considering the right of ingress and egress, is such
as to create incorporeal, movable, real rights.53 This classification
may pose conceptual problems in a different context that should
only be noted here.
SAND AND GRAVEL LEASES
Agreements pertaining to sand and gravel ownership and pro-
duction are governed by the Mineral Code just as are oil and gas
matters. However, the business is rather dissimilar, involving dif-
ferent production techniques and marketing arrangements; hence,
the leases for sand and gravel development differ from those for oil
and gas in some aspects. It is not surprising, then, that one finds
litigation on points of law touching on sand and gravel leases that
already appear to be well established in oil and gas lease cases.
Several points should be noted in regard to Quality Materials of
Tangipahoa, Inc. v. Labarama,5" a decision from the First Circuit
Court of Appeal. The plaintiffs sought to dissolve a sand and gravel
mining lease they had granted to Labarama. They tried first to
maintain that a lease with a primary term of five years, but with in-
definite continuation at lessee's option so long as the lessee main-
tained mining, provided however that the lessee could be inopera-
tive for as long as 180 days, was invalid for a potestative condition.
The court held this was not potestative, a point well established for
similar oil and gas lease provisions."
A second contention of the plaintiffs was that, while the lessee
could be inoperative for up to 180 days under the lease, the defen-
dant had passed a fifteen month period with total royalty payment
of only $46.68, and this amounted to a lack of operations, thereby
justifying cancellation of the lease. The court, overturning the trial
court's decision, said that this was merely a question of diligent
operation under the lease and low production could be excused by
the lack of a market. Further, the court held that the "law does not
favor cancellation of leases" and found cancellation inappropriate
here." As to both matters, this is a strikingly different approach
from that taken by the second circuit in Vetter57 and Waseco.58 Why
is this, and why does the court make no reference to the Mineral
53. 368 So. 2d at 735-36.
54. 361 So. 2d 1285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
55. Id. at 1289, citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2036.
56. 361 So. 2d at 1290.
57. See text at notes 32-33, supra.
58. See text at notes 34-38, supra.
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Code or analogous cases involving oil and gas leases? This is not to
suggest the court is in error in this case but only to raise the point
that there is no sound reason for the courts to be so quick to cancel
oil and gas leases, yet very reluctant when a lease of a different
mineral is at issue.
The third circuit was also asked to invalidate a sand and gravel
lease agreement on the basis of an alleged potestative condition. In
Bullock v. Louisiana Industries"' the plaintiff had granted the defen-
dant an option to take a sand and gravel lease. Suit was filed to set
it aside and the defendant sought to exercise its option which plain-
tiff and his assignees refused to allow. The court held that the mere
fact that it was an option to be exercised by the defendant did not
make it a unilateral contract. The fact that the defendant was not
bound to mine once it exercised the option did not make it subject
to a potestative condition because rental had to be paid until there
was mining and then royalty had to be paid once mining was under
way. Nor did the defendant's right to terminate the lease on twenty
day notice amount to a potestative condition. Each of these points
has been well established for many years with respect to oil and gas
leases, and one wonders why they were even carried to the court of
appeal. The defendant was granted specific performance on its
reconventional demand seeking to exercise its option.
Slay v. Smith,"0 also a decision of the third circuit, held that
ownership of a sand and gravel lease cannot be established by parol
evidence. As with the oil and gas lease, it must be in writing. How-
ever, the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering in quantum
meruit for expenses and use of his trucks and equipment in oper-
ating under the oral agreements.
59. 370 So. 2d 148 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
60. 368 So. 2d 1144 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
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